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the relation of a surety and any action by the parties which would
release a surety will release her property."8 Thus if the time of
payment is extended without her consent her property is released.29
It is settled, however, that a surety who contracts so as to alter
the general rules of suretyship must abide by such contract. So
while an extension of time of payment between the creditor and
principal debtor operates as a release of the surety, ° this right
may be waived by such surety, either in advance or afterwards."
Thus the wife, when joined by her husband, can become personal
surety for another but not for her husband, and by complying with
Article 1299 she may mortgage her realty to secure another's debt
or obligation, even that of her husband, but no personal liability
is created by such mortgage.
There is merit in the restriction as to the wife's becoming a per-
sonal surety for her husband. If the law were otherwise it would
afford an opportunity for the coercive and needy husband to work
his will and to deplete the wife's separate estate, and yet an ob-
vious counter argument presents itself. A wife can mortgage her
separate property as a surety even for her husband's debts; practi-
cally, then, it is doubtful whether the present restriction prevents
coercive husbands from gaining their ends.
John K. Bowlin.
THE WIFE'S EMERGENCY POWERS
W HERE emergencies, such as abandonment or insanity, arise,
the Texas statutes expressly provide an increase in the
wife's power to convey. The statutes make no express provision
for an increase in the wife's power to contract in similar situations.
28 Wofford v. Unger, 55 Tex. 480 (1881).
21 Borden et. ux. v. Arnold et al., 94 S. W. (2d) 216, Tex. Civ. App. 1936) writ of
error refused.
30 Benson v. Phipps, 87 Tex. 578, 29 S. W. 1066 (1895).
-1 Nat. Bank of Commerce v. Kenny, et al., 98 Tex. 293, 83 S. W. 368 (1904).
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As a result, when emergencies arise, the wife's power to convey is
based on express statutes, while her power to contract is based on
a construction of all the statutes in light of the circumstances.
THE EMERGENCY POWER TO CONTRACT
Insanity
Before the emergency, the wife possesses various statutory
powers, most of them implied. When she uses these powers, her
agreements bind her personally.' She may contract without the
husband's joinder for necessaries for herself and children2 and
for expenses incidental to the management and control of her sep-
arate property 3 and probably of such community property as the
statutes commit to her charge.4 With the joinder of her husband,
she may contract as joint maker of a note or as a surety.' In addi-
tion, she may contract in excess of her implied powers and waive
her defense of coverture, as such a contract is voidable, not void,"
and binds her unless she timely interposes such defense.7 Insanity
of the husband does not deprive her of these powers. The question
is whether such emergency adds to them.
In Lee v. Hall Music Co.' the wife was sued on certain promis-
sory notes, executed by her without joinder of her insane husband.
The plaintiff's sole basis for recovery was that the husband's in-
sanity allowed the wife to contract freely and bind herself, despite
her plea of coverture. Recovery was denied as the pleadings failed
to allege that the notes were executed by the wife for a purpose
authorized by law and the wife had established her defense of cov-
erture. Recognizing it was faced with the question whether the bare
fact that the husband was insane relieved the wife of her disabili-
123 Trx. Jtit. 199 (1932).
2 Trammell v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 179 S. W. 271 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
Cauble v. Beaver-Electra Refining Co., 115 Tex. 1, 274 S. W. 120 (1925).
4 Hawkins v. Britton State Bank, 122 Tex. 69, 52 S. W. (2d) 243 (1932).
, TEx. Ri~v. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948), Art. 4623.
6 Leake v. Saunders, 84 S. W. (2d) 993 (Tex. Com. App. 1935).
7 23 Trx. JuR. 232 (1932).
8 Lee v. Hall Music Co., 119 Te'. 547, 35 S. W. (2d) 685 (1931).
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ties, the Supreme Court said the only effect was to impliedly
enlarge her previous contractual powers.
Where the insane husband has no separate property and there
are no children, the wife is authorized to manage, control and dis-
pose of the community without qualifying as community survivor.9
Where there are children she is allowed to convey community
property if there are existing community debts qualifying as com-
munity survivor.' As she is allowed such control over the com-
munity property, she would seem to have the necessarily implied
power to contract incidental thereto. For example, she apparently
could contract to extend a community note. These appear to be the
only direct results of the husband's insanity in enlarging the wife's
contractual powers. In other words, she continues to possess her
previous powers to contract incidental to the control allowed her
over her separate property and now receives power to contract inci-
dental to such control as is allowed her over the community
property.
Where there are children, but no existing community debts, it
is necessary she qualify as community survivor by filing applica-
tion and posting bond to exercise control over the community
property. Where the husband has separate property it is necessary
that the wife be appointed guardian of such property in order to
exercise control of it." Where the wife does qualify in these two
situations, it appears she may contract incidental to the control
allowed her. In such case, her enlarged contractual powers result
from her qualifying as survivor or guardian, not from her hus-
band's insanity. Of course, her power to contract for necessaries
may be given a wider application by the courts in the situation, as
the definition given to necessaries depends on the circumstances. 2
9 TE.x. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948), Art. 3662. The reference to separate property
seems inappropriate as the chapter deals with community administration.
10 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Still, 163 S. W. (2d) 268 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) writ
of error refused.
11 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) Art. 4121.
1223 Tex. Jun. 200 (1932).
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The community administration statutes make no mention of the
emergency where the husband permanently abandons the wife.
Although the husband's insanity does not relieve the wife of her
disabilities, the courts will not allow her to use such defense to the
injury of third parties relying on her representations as a feme
sole. In Wilson v. Beck13 the wife entered into a partition agree-
ment, while her husband was insane, representing herself as a feme
sole and saying her husband was dead. The court refused to allow
her defense of coverture, saying that while the law affords a mar-
ried woman ample protection, when she either mistakenly or pur-
posely assumes the status of a feme sole and parties contract with
her with reference to that status, she will not thereafter be per-
mitted to repudiate such contracts, to the injury and damage of
persons misled.
In summary: the wife of an insane husband continues to possess
her statutory powers to contract. Apparently the only enlarge-
ment in her contractural powers is the implied power incidental
to the control allowed her over the community property. To exer-
cise such control, she must qualify as community survivor unless
the husband has no separate property and there are no children
or there are children but existing community debts. Contracts
executed in excess of the foregoing powers are voidable and may
be rendered void by her timely defense of coverture, unless she
is estopped to deny them.
Abandonment
When the wife is thrown on her own resources by her husband's
permanent abandonment, the courts feel she would be defenseless
against the many demands and responsibilities inevitably facing
her, unless accorded the freedom of contract. The decisions appear
to give a liberal definition of this emergency. For example, they
have considered the wife permanently abandoned when she was
forced to leave her husband due to his threats. When the husband
13 Wilson v. Beck, 286 S. W. 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) writ of error refused.
1950]
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has left the wife, the courts have considered her permanently
abandoned when placed on her own resources, whether the hus-
band's actions were intentional or unintentional, as where he was
confined in a penitentiary. Thus, the husband's return, while show-
ing the abandonment was not "permanent," apparently will not
affect her interim contracts. In Wright v. Hays," an early leading
case involving such emergency, the Supreme Court said:
"The default of the husband and the necessity of the wife's situation
require and the law authorizes her to assume his position for the care
of herself, her family and property, and vest her with the capacity of
a leme sole."
Whether the courts consider the wife a feme sole for all pur-
poses or merely to the extent of the necessity is not clear. During
the emergency, she has been allowed to contract for necessaries
and mortgage her separate property or the community property as
security. 5 She has been permitted to contract to extend community
debts and liens and to contract concerning repair of property she
has rented. 6 Where she contracted for necessaries and non-neces-
saries, she and the husband have been held liable for the nec-
essaries and the wife alone for the non-necessaries. 7 The basis of
her liability for the non-necessaries was her implied contractual
powers incidental to control over her separate property.
It appears the wife could have executed the foregoing contracts
under her prior implied powers. Most of the cases involved
necessaries. When the wife finds herself abandoned, the scope of
her necessaries obviously increases, and the courts may exercise
wide discretion in enlarging her implied powers, as the term nec-
essaries is determined by the circumstances. In such case, the wife
14 Wright v. Hays, 10 Tex. 130, 135 (1853).
"I Bradley v. Gilliam, 260 S. W. 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) ; Williams v. Farmer's
National Bank of Stephenville, 201 S. W. 1083 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) writ of error
refused; Fermier v. Brannan, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 543, 53 S. W. 699 (1899).
16 See Ulmer v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 161 S. W .(2d) 862, 865 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1942) writ of error refused want of merit; Crowder v. McLeo~d, 151 S. W. 1166
(Tex. Civ. App. 1912) writ of error dismissed; Heagy v. Kastner, 138 S. W. 78 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1911).
1rPalmer v. Cogilan, 55 S. W. 1122 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900).
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does not gain a new power; she merely has a prior power enlarged.
Whether or not her contracts for necessaries bind her personally
will depend on the agreement with the creditor as to whether he
will look to her, her husband or both of them for payment. As a
result, her creditors may find themselves in a difficult situation.
If they continue contracting with the wife after the abandonment
they may be faced with the necessity of reaching the husband, as
his liability is not relieved by the abandonment of his wife."8 It is
clear, however, if the wife contracts with parties relying on her rep-
resentatons that she is abandoned, she will be estopped to deny
liability on such contracts.' 9
The wife continues to possess powers incidental to her control
over her separate property and such community property as the
statutes commit to her charge.2" When abandoned, she is allowed
complete control over her separate realty2' and the community
realty to the extent of the necessity.22 As a result, her contractual
powers incidental to such control would appear enlarged. Effect
of the emergency on control allowed her over the so-called special
community property is beyond the scope of this comment.2" It is
sufficient to say that any increase in control allowed her would
seem to increase her contractual powers.
If the courts intend the wife to be a feme sole for all purposes,
a logical result would be that she has unlimited power to contract.
Yet she has been allowed to escape liability by pleading coverture
to a note endorsed by her without joinder of her husband, as re-
quired by statute.24 The court recognized a permanent abandoned
wife may make obligations binding on her separate property and
the community property under certain conditions. However, it
18 Black v. Bryan, 18 Tex. 453 (1857).
19 See Wilson v. Beck, supra, note 13, at 319.
20 See notes 3 and 4, supra.
21 Harris v. Hamilton, 221 S. W. 273 (Tex. Com. App. 1920).
22 Keys v. Tarrant Co. Bldg. and Loan Association, 286 S. W. 593 (Tex .Civ. App.
1926).
23 See comment on special community property in this symposium.
24 TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) Art. 4623.
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added that the statute was too clear in specifying that the wife must
be joined by her husband in order to make a note or be a surety to
allow any other construction.25 Since the decisions are not clear as
to the extent that the wife is considered a feme sole, the courts
would seem faced with the question only when necessary to allow
her to contract in excess of her prior powers, enlarged by the emer-
gency.
To repeat briefly: although the courts refer to a permanently
abandoned wife as a ferne sole, she has been limited to powers she
possessed prior to the emergency or received as an incident to the
control allowed her over her separate property and the community
property due to the emergency. The decisions have not allowed
her the complete freedom accorded an actual feme sole, although
it seems clear that her prior powers are enlarged. The extent to
which the courts will consider the wife a feme sole would seem to
depend on the necessity of the situation.
THE EMERGENCY POWER TO CONVEY
Insanity
Statutory requirements that the wife be joined by her husband
in conveying her separate property, whether lands26 or home-
stead,2" are relaxed when the husband becomes insane. In Ross v.
Tide Water Oil Co. 2 1 the wife, without joinder of her insane hus-
band, conveyed her separate property, which was their homestead.
The Supreme Court allowed the conveyance, saying the insanity
invested the wife with authority to convey her separate property,
whether homestead or not, without his joinder, and it was not nec-
essary that she apply to the district court for permission. Referring
to Articles 4617 and 4618,29 the court said that they allow the wife
to convey her separate property, homestead or not, without joinder
25 First National Bank of Mt. Calm v. Roller, 299 S. W. 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927);
agirmed on point discussed in 14 S. W. (2d) 834 (Tex. Com. App. 1929).
26 Trx. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) Art. 4614.
27 Tx. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) Art. 4618.
28 Ross v. Tide Water Oil Co., 136 Tex. 66, 145 S. W. (2d) 1089 (1941).
29 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) Art. 4617, Art. 4618.
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of her husband, when he is insane or has permanently abandoned
her, and these articles are permissive rather than mandatory when
directing that the wife may apply to the district court for permis-
sion. These statutes make no mention of children so it appears that
their presence is immaterial. Apparently the word may used in
each article indicates a legislative intent to provide the wife an
additional method, which may be made a matter of record, for
conveying her separate property in such emergencies.
Where community property is involved, the rights of the wife
depend on the community administration statutes or the existence
of community debts. 0 It is obvious that the husband's full control
over the community must be delegated. If there are no children
and no separate property of the husband, the community passes
to the wife, charged with community debts."1 The wife does not
receive any addition to her undivided half-title, as she normally
does at her husband's death. She merely receives the power to
manage, control and sell the community property to pay debts or,
in the absence of community debts, to dispose of it in a manner
permitted to the husband during the normal marital relation. 2 She
receives such a qualified passing of title for the purpose of an
informal administration of the community, and loses such control
if and when her husband regains his sanity.3
Where there are children and no community debts, the wife must
qualify as community survivor" to exercise control. She must
satisfy the rules governing a husband when his wife becomes in-
sane, including the posting of the required bond.8" On qualifying,
she exercises the same rights as would the husband in the con-
30 See notes 9 and 10, supra.
S Tsx. REv. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) Art. 3662.
82 Lee v. Hall Music Co., supra, note 8; Schwarz v. West, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 136, 84
S. W. 282 (1904) ; 23 Tzx. JUR. 144 (1932).
33 23 TE.x. JUR. 252 (1932).
34 Survivor as used in community administration indicates a sane person representing
an insane person, as well as a living person representing a deceased person. TEX. REV.
CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) Art. 3679.
35 Tx. Rav. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) Art. 3667.
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verse situation to control, manage and dispose of the community.8"
Her control continues until she remarries in event of her hus-
band's death. 7 Where there are children and existing community
debts, the requirement that she qualify as community survivor is
relaxed. In Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Still" the wife executed an
oil and gas lease, joined by her insane husband. The court said
the wife of an insane husband, where there are children, has
power to convey mineral interests in the community homestead to
pay existing community debts, without qualifying under the com-
munity administration statutes. It should be remembered that this
case applies only when there are existing community debts.
To summarize: the wife of an insane husband may convey her
separate property, whether lands or homestead, without her
husband's joinder and without receiving permission of the district
court. Where there are no children and no separate property of
the husband, she is the informal administratrix of the community,
with power to convey, without qualifying as community survivor,
whether community debts exist or not. Where there are children
and no community debts, she exercises full control and disposal
of the community property after qualifying as community sur-
vivor. Where there are children and community debts, she may
convey community property without so qualifying.
Abandonment
It appears settled that a permanently abandoned wife may con-
vey her separate property, whether homestead or not, without
joinder of her husband.39 In Harris v. Hamilton the court said:
"The basis of these decisions is that, while the married relation has not
been legally severed, a status is created in the wife, in so far as her
36 Howell v. Fidelity Lumber Co., 228 S. W. 181 (Tex. Com. App. 1921).
37 Tsx. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) Art. 3678.
88 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Still, supra, note 10.
39 Hector v. Knox, 63 Tex. 613 (1885) ; Service Parts Co. v. Bizzell, 120 S. W. (2d)
919 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) ; Mabry v. Citizen's Lumber Co., 47 Tex. Civ. App. 443, 105
S. W. 1156 (1907) writ of error refused.
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property rights are concerned, identical with that of a feme sole, giving
her full power over her property the same as if the marital relation
did not exist. °40
Articles 4617 and 461841 make express provision for such emer-
gency conveyances. The Supreme Court's decision that these stat-
utes are permissive rather than mandatory when providing that the
wife may apply to the district court for permission has been dis-
cussed previously.42 By analogy it would seem possible for her to
convey her separate stocks and bonds without the husband's joinder.
Where the land is community, it seems settled the permanently
abandoned wife may convey without her husband's joinder. How-
ever, it appears that her conveyances are allowed only where neces-
sary to protect the community interest or support the family.43
Under the statutes prior to 1927 the courts allowed the wife such
an emergency increase in power. In that year, Article 461944 was
amended so as to provide the wife express relief where her hus-
band disappears and his whereabouts remains unknown to her
more than twelve months. By satisfying the article's requirements,
she is allowed full control, management and disposition of the
community, with the same power conferred by law upon the hus-
band, and her acts shall be as those of a feme sole. Such control
continues until the husband returns and such fact is filed for
record in the appropriate county. As the legislature used the man-
datory word shall in directing how the wife should petition the dis-
trict court to receive the article's benefit, it would seem necessary
40 Harris v. Hamilton, 221 S. W. 273, 275 (Tex. Com. App. 1920).
41 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) Art. 4617, Art. 4618.
42 See note 29, supra.
43 See Clements v. Ewing, 71 Tex. 370, 372, 9 S. W. 312, 313 (1888) ; Slator v. Neal,
64 Tex. 222 (1885) which says confinement of husband in penitentiary is an abandon-
ment; Heidenheimer v. Thomas, 63 Tex. 287 (1885) ; Anna Berta Lodge v. Leverton, 42
Tex. 18 (1875) ; Keys v. Tarrant Co. Bldg. and Loan Association, supra, note 22; Royall
v. Webster, 279 S. W. 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) ; Newman v. Gill, 243 S. W. 697 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1922).
4 4 TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) Art. 4619.
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that such permission be received before she exercise control of the
community.
As Article 4619 specifies the sole emergency where "the husband
shall have disappeared and his whereabouts shall have been and
remain unknown to the wife continuously for more than twelve
months," what effect does it have on the formerly recognized
rights of a permanently abandoned wife whose plight does not fit
this specific emergency?
In Masterson v. Bouldin the court was faced with the issue of
whether a permanently abandoned wife must apply to a district
court for permission to convey the community property. The court
said the law was well settled before Article 4619 was amended
that a deserted wife could make such a conveyance when necessary.
When the legislature amended Article 4619, the caption of the
amending act specified that the only change intended was depend-
ent upon the fact that the husband shall have disappeared and his
whereabouts have been and remain unknown to the wife more than
twelve months. As the legislature impliedly negatived any inten-
tion to change the prior effect of the statute, the court reasoned
that Article 4619 does not affect the power of a wife permanently
separated from her husband to convey community property as
established by prior decisions.
To restate briefly: a permanently abandoned wife may convey
her separate lands, including the homestead, and such community
property as is necessary to protect the community interest or sup-
port the family, without her husband's joinder and without receiv-
ing permission of the district court. Apparently she may be al-
lowed to transfer her separate stocks and bonds in the same man-
ner. Where her husband disappears and his whereabouts remains
unknown more than twelve months and she receives permission of
the district court, she may exercise complete control and disposi-
tion of the community property, subject to his return.
Marvin Skelton.
45 Masterson v. Bouldin, 151 S. W. (2d) 301 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) writ of error
refused.
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